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ABSTRACT
In multimedia forensics, learning-based methods provide state-of-
the-art performance in determining origin and authenticity of images
and videos. However, most existing methods are challenged by out-
of-distribution data, i.e., with characteristics that are not covered in
the training set. This makes it difficult to know when to trust a model,
particularly for practitioners with limited technical background.
In this work, we make a first step toward redesigning forensic
algorithms with a strong focus on reliability. To this end, we propose
to use Bayesian neural networks (BNN), which combine the power
of deep neural networks with the rigorous probabilistic formulation
of a Bayesian framework. Instead of providing a point estimate like
standard neural networks, BNNs provide distributions that express
both the estimate and also an uncertainty range.
We demonstrate the usefulness of this framework on a classical
forensic task: resampling detection. The BNN yields state-of-the-art
detection performance, plus excellent capabilities for detecting out-
of-distribution samples. This is demonstrated for three pathologic
issues in resampling detection, namely unseen resampling factors,
unseen JPEG compression, and unseen resampling algorithms. We
hope that this proposal spurs further research toward reliability in
multimedia forensics.
Index Terms— digital image forensics, reliability, Bayesian
neural networks, resampling detection
1. INTRODUCTION
The goal of image forensics is to validate origin and authenticity of
digital images. Most state-of-the-art forensic methods are based on
deep learning. Notable example applications are to blindly validate
noise statistics [1], to link EXIF tags to noise statistics [2], to de-
tect artifacts of commonly used operators [3, 4], to detect computer-
generated imagery [5, 6], or to detect JPEG inconsistencies [7].
The success of learning-based methods can broadly be attributed
to their excellent capability in deriving most subtle cues from train-
ing examples. However, one notable disadvantage of learning-based
methods is their sensitivity to out-of-distribution data: if a test image
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differs too much from the training dataset, learning-based methods
oftentimes exhibit difficulties in detecting these cues [8].
Such out-of-distribution scenarios are, unfortunately, quite com-
mon in the practical forensic work: oftentimes, little is known about
the exact provenance of an image, particularly when it was found
on the internet. For example, there may be only limited knowledge
about the type and amount of in-camera processing that an image
underwent, and limited knowledge about distribution-related post-
processing such as the implementation of the JPEG library of a web
platform. Current forensic methods address this issue with extensive
data augmentation [1, 2, 5, 6]. The aim of such data augmentation is
to anticipate a rich variety of commonly seen processing steps and
compression variants to harden the network against variations of the
input data.
However, although current methods achieve impressive results
on a wide variety of inputs, augmentation can only extend the hori-
zon of seen data. It does not provide knowledge about potential
failure cases from unseen data. This can be a severe practical limi-
tation: a forensic analyst has to understand on which data a method
can operate or not in order to assess its output.
In this work, we propose a different direction to mitigate this is-
sue: The first contribution is to propose Bayesian neural networks
(BNNs) for image forensics to intrinsically model uncertainty about
the data. BNNs combine the strengths of deep neural networks with
a rigorous probabilistic framework. Thus, BNNs are also amenable
to data augmentation to increase the range of seen data, but they can
also detect whenever operating on unseen data. This enables an an-
alyst to know about network uncertainty without requiring expertise
in the technical specifics.
The second contribution is to demonstrate the usefulness of the
proposed approach on a classical forensic task, namely the detection
of resampling. The proposed BNN achieves state-of-the-art detec-
tion performance. Additionally, it shows impressive capabilities to
detect out-of-distribution inputs on three notorious issues in resam-
pling detection, namely previously unseen rescaling ranges, JPEG
postcompression, and rescaling algorithms.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we describe re-
lated work on uncertainty modeling in neural networks and on re-
sampling detection. Section 3 introduces the basic concepts of the
Bayesian framework for convolutional neural networks (CNNs) and
variational inference. Section 4 presents experimental results on var-
ious resampling scenarios. Section 5 concludes with a brief sum-
mary and outlook.
2. RELATED WORK
Detecting out-of-distribution examples has recently gained popular-
ity in the machine learning community. Hendrycks and Gimpel pro-
posed the softmax activations of a neural network to anticipate incor-
rect classifications and detect out-of-distribution samples [9]. How-
ever, the usefulness of softmax statistics is limited. Guo et al. show
that these softmax probabilities do not accurately represent the “true
correctness likelihood” [10]. Liang et al. [11] propose to calibrate
softmax activations to the model confidence via temperature scaling
and input preprocessing similar to the fast gradient sign method in-
troduced by [12]. This approach results in a local distillation of the
input space, but it does not solve the general problems that neural
networks make confident errors and do not provide information of
their predictive uncertainty. To address these issues, DeVries and
Taylor [13] propose to learn confidence estimates by training a net-
work with two output branches producing prediction and uncertainty
estimate.
Similar goals to model uncertainty can be achieved with a
Bayesian framework, which has a more solid theoretical foundation.
Gal and Ghahramani [14] show how Bayesian inference can be ap-
proximated with standard CNNs using dropout at test time. Inspired
by their approach, Lakshminarayanan et al. [15] use an ensemble
of networks to obtain uncertainty estimates. Both works, how-
ever, do not model the full posterior distribution but are a discrete
approximation of the Bayesian approach.
Blundell et al. [16] show that Bayesian methods can be ap-
plied to neural networks to model probability distributions over the
trainable weights instead of point estimates. This property enables
the network to predict uncertainty based on which the analyst can
choose whether or not to trust the model’s prediction. Bayesian
neural networks have demonstrated impressive results in various
tasks, e.g., pixel-wise depth regression [17], biomedical image seg-
mentation [18]. We argue that this framework is also particularly
well suited for the field of forensics.
We demonstrate the usefulness of the Bayesian framework on
the classical forensic task of resampling detection. In resampling
detection, the assumption is that when an object is spliced into an
image, it is likely resized or rotated to fit into the target scene. Algo-
rithmically, resizing or rotation is typically implemented as a resam-
pling operation. In the past 15 years, many analytic forensic tech-
niques were proposed to detect resampling, e.g., via quasi-periodic
inter-pixel correlations [19], random matrix theory [20], or natural
image statistics [21].
Several learning-based methods achieve similar goals, either by
directly detecting resampling [22] or the resampling factor [23], or
indirectly via camera-based image forgery localization [24] or the
detection of image splicing [25]. However, learning-based meth-
ods are sensitive to mismatches between training and test data. For
example, Liu and Kirchner report that their CNN for rescaling fac-
tor estimation suffers from poor generalization to unseen resampling
algorithms like bicubic interpolation [23]. They also report that in-
cluding more diverse training examples lead to a reduction in the
overall accuracy. Moreover, it is certainly intractable to cover all
possible real-world scenarios in the training data.
3. BAYESIAN NETS AND VARIATIONAL INFERENCE
Standard neural networks can be seen as universal function approx-
imators, able to represent an arbitrary function G(x) within an arbi-
trary small but fixed distance ε by a learned function gω(x),
|G(x)− gω(x)| < ε . (1)
Here, ω ∈ IRt denotes the t trainable network parameters or
weights. Training is usually formulated as an optimization prob-
lem, and solved for the optimal weights ω via gradient descent.
These weights are scalar quantities and hence form a point estimate.
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Fig. 1: Baseline CNN: prediction confidence (blue) versus accuracy
(red), averaged over 128 samples for scaling factors from 0.1 to 2.0
with step size 0.1 (see text for details).
Standard neural networks can learn powerful representations. How-
ever, they also suffer from overly confident decisions on unseen
data. Moreover, these models are by design deterministic, and as
such not able to express uncertainty in their decisions.
The BNN does not learn point estimates, but instead the pos-
terior distribution P (ω|D) over the weights ω given some training
data D = {(xi, yi)}, i = 1 . . . S. Here, S is the number of train-
ing samples, and the samples are tuples of input images xi and their
corresponding class label yi that follows a categorical distribution.
Exact Bayesian inference, i.e., the exact calculation of the poste-
rior, is intractable due to the large number of parameters in a neural
network. Blundell et al. [16] introduced the Bayes by Backprop al-
gorithm, which approaches a variational approximation of the pos-
terior distribution. It enables to learn a probability distribution over
the trainable weights in a network.
Variational learning aims to find optimal parameters θ of the
weight distribution q(ω|θ), which is achieved when q(ω|θ) is sim-
ilar to the true unknown distribution P (ω|D). This corresponds to
minimizing the Kullback-Leibler divergence
θ∗ = argmin
θ
KL [q(ω|θ)||P (ω|D)]
= argmin
θ
∫
q(ω|θ) log q(ω|θ)
P (ω|D)dω
= argmin
θ
∫
q(ω|θ) log q(ω|θ)
P (ω)P (D|ω)dω
= argmin
θ
∫
q(ω|θ) log q(ω|θ)
P (ω)
− q(ω|θ) logP (D|ω)dω
= argmin
θ
∫
q(ω|θ) log q(ω|θ)
P (ω)
dω −
∫
q(ω|θ) logP (D|ω)dω
= argmin
θ
KL [q(ω|θ)||P (ω)]− IEq(ω|θ) [logP (D|ω)] .
(2)
In the last equation, the second term denotes the negative log-
likelihood, which is usually optimized via maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE). The first term acts as regularizer in a maximum
a posteriori (MAP) sense. Overall, Eqn. 2 minimizes the negative
log-likelihood while enforcing a small Kullback-Leibler divergence
between the weight distribution and the prior distribution. This cost
function is known as the evidence lower bound (elbo) loss. Direct
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Fig. 2: Uncertainty of the Bayesian CNN. Blue: prediction probability for “rescaled”, averaged over 128 input samples. Red: two standard
deviations from the mean, calculated from 50 Monte Carlo draws from the posterior probability. Green: scaling factors for network training.
optimization of this cost function is computationally expensive.
However, it can be approximated as a function of the training dataD
and the variational parameters θ via gradient descent and the domi-
nated convergence theorem, which allows to interchange a derivative
with an expectation. This allows to rewrite the optimization problem
in Eqn. 2 to
f(ω, θ) = log q(ω|θ)− logP (ω)− logP (D|ω) . (3)
The exact cost then can be approximated as
F(D, θ) ≈
n∑
i=1
log q(ωi|θ)− logP (ωi)− logP (D|ωi) , (4)
where ωi denotes the i-th sample drawn from the variational pos-
terior. The Bayes by Backprop algorithm introduced by Blundell
et al. [16] was formulated for feed-forward neural networks using
fully connected layers. Their approach can be generalized to convo-
lutional neural networks by applying flipout convolution [26]. This
enables the estimation of the predictive posterior via sampling from
the variational posterior, similar to [18],
IEq(ω|θ) [P (y
∗|x∗)] =
∫
P (y∗|x∗,ω)q(ω|θ)dω (5)
≈ 1
n
n∑
i=1
Pωi(y
∗|x∗) , (6)
where x∗ denotes unseen data, y∗ the predicted class label and
Pωi(y
∗ |x∗) a draw from the predictive posterior. The approxi-
mation in Eqn. 6 samples n times from the trained network on
unseen data. The variance of this estimator expresses the network’s
uncertainty in its prediction [18],
Var(P (y|x)) = IEq(ω|θ)[yyT ]− IEq(ω|θ)[y]IEq(ω|θ)[y]T . (7)
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We conduct a series of experiments on rescaling detection to evaluate
the robustness of the Bayesian CNN (BNN) and its ability to express
predictive uncertainty.
Dataset Preparation. We randomly select 1 000 uncompressed
high-resolution images from the RAISE dataset [27]. Each RGB
color image is converted to grayscale using the ITU-R 601-2 luma
transform. The 1 000 images are split into 800 images for training,
100 images for validation, and 100 images for testing. Each image
is further processed as follows: one copy is left as original, and one
copy is rescaled with a rescaling factor s = 0.9 + k · 0.05, where
k is randomly chosen between 0 and 11 excluding 2, i.e., scaling
factors are between 0.9 and 1.45 excluding the identity 1.00. From
both copies we randomly draw N = 50 non-overlapping patches of
256×256 pixels. Hence, training, validation, and testing sets consist
of 80 000, 10 000, and 10 000 patches from disjunct images.
Network Architectures. As a baseline, we use the popular con-
strained convolutional architecture by Bayar and Stamm [28]. We
implement this architecture in Tensorflow, but omit the extremely
randomized trees classifier in order to perform a frictionless com-
parison of end-to-end deep learning architectures.
The Bayesian network uses the baseline network as template,
with the same number of layers, same number and dimensions of the
filter kernels per convolution layer, and the same constrained convo-
lution layer. The Bayesian property is obtained via flipout convolu-
tion and fully-connected layers [26] from the Tensorflow probability
framework [29]. As prior distribution we assume a zero-mean Gaus-
sian distribution with unit-variance. For inference, we use Eqn. 6
with n = 50 Monte Carlo draws, and we calculate the predictive
variance via Eqn. 7. We assume a normally-distributed variational
posterior, hence the Bayesian network has twice as many training
parameters as the baseline CNN.
Training Parameters We use the Adam optimizer with a learn-
ing rate of l = 10−3, β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999 and  = 10−7, and
a batch size of 64. The baseline is trained for 100 000 iterations.
The BNN for 150 000 iterations due to twice the network parame-
ters. The reported results use the model that best performs on the
validation set, which is evaluated every 1 000 iterations.
4.1. Detection Accuracy
The baseline model and the Bayesian CNN are trained for the de-
tection of rescaling using the same datasets and hyper-parameters.
On the test set, the baseline achieves 96.32% accuracy. This is com-
parable to [28] given that the additional extremely randomised trees
for performance boosting are omitted. The Bayesian CNN achieves
97.40% accuracy, which is comparable, even slightly better.
4.2. Standard CNN and Out-of-Distribution Samples
We first show that a standard CNN does not provide helpful infor-
mation to detect out-of-distribution samples. To this end, recall that
the baseline CNN is trained on resampling factors in the range of
s ∈ {0.9 . . . 1.45}. For testing, we create a second test set with re-
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(a) JPEG-compression (q = 85)
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(b) JPEG-compression (q = 50)
Fig. 3: Uncertainty by the Bayesian CNN on out-of-distribution test
samples with JPEG postcompression.
sampling factors s′ = {0.1 . . . 2.0} in steps of 0.1. With exception
of the resampling range, the test set preparation follows the exact
same protocol as the previous dataset. In particular, the test images
are unseen during network training. We selectM = 128 patches per
rescaling factor, and calculate average accuracy and confidence per
rescaling factor. The confidence is calculated as [9]
cs =
1
M
M∑
m=1
max
yk
P (yk | xm) , (8)
i.e., averaging the highest activation per decision per rescaling factor.
The results are shown in Fig. 1. The rescaling factors 0.1 to 2.0
are on the x-axis. The range of rescaling factors for network train-
ing is shown in green. Red bars indicate the accuracy of the base-
line method per rescaling factor s. Blue bars indicate the associated
confidence cs. It can be observed that the blue confidence bars are
always very high, at or beyond 0.9. Moreover, the confidence is in-
dependent of the actual network accuracy, which significantly varies
across resampling factors. This makes it impossible to predict the
network performance from the distribution of class activations.
4.3. Uncertainty in Out-of-Distribution Resampling Factors
The previous experiment is repeated with the BNN. To this end, we
expand the range of rescaling factors even further to [0.1; 4.1] with
step size 0.01, and leave all other experimental parameters identical.
The results are shown in Fig. 2. Green indicates the range of
training data. The blue line shows the mean prediction probability
for “rescaled”, averaged over M = 128 randomly selected patches.
Red indicates two standard deviations of the uncertainty. The net-
work excellently performs inside the train region, distinguishing the
original and rescaled patches with over 99% confidence, while ex-
hibiting very low uncertainty in its decision. The network general-
izes very well for scaling factors s ≥ 1.5. With increasing distance
to the training region, the uncertainty grows accordingly with a slight
reduction in accuracy, which is the desired behavior. For downscal-
ing, the network is able to detect scaling factors s ≥ 0.7, i.e., in
direct proximity to the train region. For scaling factors s < 0.7,
the network prediction performance drops considerably, and the un-
certainty again grows accordingly. Hence, the network uncertainty
indicates its inability to operate on this input. We consider this an
important cue for a forensic analyst to not trust the network output.
Both networks, the baseline in Fig. 1 and the Bayesian CNN
in Fig. 2, make errors on out-of-distribution examples. However,
where the standard CNN makes extremely overconfident errors, the
Bayesian CNN tends to be uncertain, which can inform the analyst
whether she can trust the network prediction or not.
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(a) nearest-neighbor interpolation
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(b) areal interpolation
Fig. 4: Uncertainty by the Bayesian CNN on out-of-distribution test
samples of nearest-neighbor and areal interpolation.
4.4. Uncertainty in Out-of-Distribution JPEG Compression
There are numerous scenarios that might not be well covered in the
classifier training set. We select two cases, namely unseen resam-
pling methods and JPEG compression after resampling.
Data augmentation with JPEG compression is routinely per-
formed in many forensic algorithms. Nevertheless, we believe that
JPEG compression is an interesting experiment, for it is widely
accepted in the forensic community as a prototypic case for out-of-
distribution samples: since the BNN training data is uncompressed,
we can observe how the BNN uncertainty serves as a metric for the
network prediction reliability. In this experiment, we recompress all
testing data with quality factors q = 85 and q = 50. The remaining
experimental protocol is identical to the previous sections.
The results of this experiment are shown in Fig. 3. As expected,
the prediction probability drops with increasing compression and
with increasing deviation from the training resampling parameters.
It is encouraging to observe that this is accurately indicated by a
simultaneous increase in the uncertainty.
4.5. Uncertainty in Out-of-Distribution Resampling Operations
A more subtle case of out-of-distribution samples are variations in
the resampling operations. Such deviations in the data distribution
are much more difficult to catch, and might even be non-obvious to
a technical expert. In this experiment, we use nearest neighbor inter-
polation and an areal interpolation on the testing data. The remaining
experimental protocol is identical to the previous sections.
The results of this experiment are shown in Fig. 4. Analogous to
the JPEG experiments, prediction probabilities are also significantly
lower, but the uncertainty increase accordingly, which again makes
it possible to detect the mismatch between training and testing data.
5. CONCLUSION
We propose a novel Bayesian deep learning approach to express pre-
dictive uncertainty in image forensics. We show on the example of
resampling detection that the Bayesian CNN avoids confident errors.
Moreover, the Bayesian framework intrinsically provides an uncer-
tainty estimate that indicates a model mismatch to a forensic analyst,
which is otherwise difficult to recognize.
This is preliminary work. We believe that BNNs can close an
important gap in image forensics, but there are still many aspects to
be investigated. In future work, we will extend this approach to other
forensic tasks, explore selection strategies for prior distributions, and
explore a decomposition of the predictive uncertainty into model and
data uncertainty [18].
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